Bounds for rating override rates by Tasche, Dirk
Bounds for rating override rates
Dirk Tasche∗
First version: March 10, 2012
This version: July 13, 2012
Overrides of credit ratings are important correctives of ratings that are determined
by statistical rating models. Financial institutions and banking regulators agree on
this because on the one hand errors with ratings of corporates or banks can have fatal
consequences for the lending institutions and on the other hand errors by statistical
methods can be minimised but not completely avoided. Nonetheless, rating overrides
can be misused in order to conceal the real riskiness of borrowers or even entire
portfolios. That is why rating overrides usually are strictly governed and carefully
recorded. It is not clear, however, which frequency of overrides is appropriate for a
given rating model within a predefined time period. This paper argues that there
is a natural error rate associated with a statistical rating model that may be used
to inform assessment of whether or not an observed override rate is adequate. The
natural error rate is closely related to the rating model’s discriminatory power and
can readily be calculated.
Keywords: Credit rating, rating override, discriminatory power, accuracy ratio,
misclassification rate.
1 Introduction
Overrides of credit ratings generated by statistical models are a somewhat controversial topic.
Financial institutions and regulators alike acknowledge that statistical models while being useful
for the acceleration of rating processes and quantification of rating results, in principle are still
inferior to careful expert assessments of creditworthiness. Nonetheless, even experienced credit
experts could undeliberately be biased to under- or overestimate the creditworthiness of certain
borrowers or groups of borrowers.
The following comment by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2006, extract
from paragraph 417) confirms and extends these observations:
“Credit scoring models and other mechanical rating procedures generally use only a subset of
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available information. Although mechanical rating procedures may sometimes avoid some of
the idiosyncratic errors made by rating systems in which human judgement plays a large role,
mechanical use of limited information also is a source of rating errors. Credit scoring models and
other mechanical procedures are permissible as the primary or partial basis of rating assignments,
and may play a role in the estimation of loss characteristics. Sufficient human judgement and
human oversight is necessary to ensure that all relevant and material information, including that
which is outside the scope of the model, is also taken into consideration, and that the model is
used appropriately.”
While it is generally expected that overrides improve the quality of rating assignments1, the
Basel Committee has a clear view on the need to monitor overriding activity (BCBS, 2006,
paragraph 428):
“For rating assignments based on expert judgement, banks must clearly articulate the situations
in which bank officers may override the outputs of the rating process, including how and to
what extent such overrides can be used and by whom. For model-based ratings, the bank must
have guidelines and processes for monitoring cases where human judgement has overridden the
models rating, variables were excluded or inputs were altered. These guidelines must include
identifying personnel that are responsible for approving these overrides. Banks must identify
overrides and separately track their performance.”
This paper is about analysing the performance of the overrides of the output of statistical rating
models. How to do this is by no means obvious. Look for instance at the case where a borrower’s
rating is suggested to be poor by a statistical model but is overridden to a high quality rating
grade. Assume that the borrower afterwards defaults within the following twelve months. At
first glance, this incident might be considered clear evidence of an unjustified override. It could,
however, just be an occurrence of bad luck. Only if we observed a significant number of such
outcomes of overrides we would be able to draw a conclusion on systematic bias of the overrides.
From this example, we can derive a first performance criterion for rating overrides: The discrim-
inatory power of a rating system post overrides should not be lower than the discriminatory
power of the system without the overrides. Another criterion, also based on a significant sample
of overrides, relates to the tendency of the overrides: If the majority of the overrides is towards
rating grades indicating poorer credit quality one has to investigate whether or not this is caused
by underestimation of the probabilities of default (PDs)2 associated with the grades of the rating
system. Careful analysis should be applied to the reasons quoted as causing the overrides: They
could give indications of risk drivers not captured by the statistical model or no longer being
predictive of creditworthiness.
Financial institutions should also look at the frequency of overrides applied to the outcomes of
rating models. Intuitively, observing a high frequency of overrides might indicate that something
is wrong with the model. This is why most financial institutions monitor the override frequencies
1The empirical evidence of the impact of overrides on rating performance is not unambiguous. Thus, in a recent
study Brown et al. (2012) found that “overall, our results suggest that the widespread use of discretion by
loan officers may not result in more accurate assessments of the creditworthiness of borrowers”. This finding,
however, might be a consequence of the fact that most of the banks providing data for the study were not
subject to the minimum requirements of the Basel II Internal Ratings Based Approach.
2In the following we will often use the acronym PD for probability of default.
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of their wholesale rating systems and, typically, trigger corrective actions when pre-defined
bounds for the override rates are exceeded.
What, however, does “high frequency” mean? Would it be 10% or rather 40% of the ratings
assigned within a year? By intuition one would say that the “critical” frequency of overrides to
indicate problems with a statistical rating model should be related to the discriminatory power
of the model. As demonstrated in figure 1, a model with low power needs more corrections – in
the shape of overrides – than a model with high power because the overlap between the rating
profiles of defaulting and solvent borrowers is larger for low power rating models. In this paper,
we suggest a method to determine bounds for override rates that should not be exceeded if
all were right with the underlying statistical model. We then investigate the link between the
discriminatory power of the statistical rating model and the proposed rating override bounds,
finding that indeed the bounds are the tighter the more powerful the model is.
We also demonstrate how ex ante estimates of discriminatory power can be inferred from the PD
curves associated with statistical rating models. Such estimates may then be used to derive the
override rate bounds needed for effective monitoring. This is particularly useful in the case of
low default portfolios where – due to the lack of default observations – monitoring and validation
to a large extent must be based on the analysis of overrides.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we discuss the connection between rating error
rates and the statistical notion of misclassification rate. We argue that the misclassification rate
related to a particular classification rule provides a suitable approximate upper bound for the
rating error rate and therefore also for the rate of overrides of the outputs of a statistical rating
model. In section 3 we describe how to calculate the override rate bounds in the special cases
of a rating model with a finite number of grades and a rating model with normally distributed
conditional score distributions. The case of the conditional normal distributions, in particular,
allows us to study the connection between override rate bounds and discriminatory power. We
also present some numerical examples to illustrate this connection. In section 4 we discuss how
the proposed bound for rating override rates fits into an illustrative framework for the monitoring
of rating overrides. Section 5 summarises and concludes the paper.
A note on the terminology. In this paper, we study rating overrides in the context of rating
systems with a small finite number k of grades3. For the purpose of the paper, it is assumed
that a statistical model is used to determine proposed ratings which may then be confirmed or
overridden by experts to give the final ratings. The direct output of the statistical model is called
score and may be discrete with a large (compared to the number of rating grades k) range of
scores or on a continuous scale. The range of the scores is decomposed into a number of disjoint
intervals each of which is then mapped to one of the rating grades, thus generating the proposed
ratings. The decomposition of the score range for the mapping to the grades usually is based on
the probabilities of default associated with the scores.
3In order to achieve comparability of their internal ratings to agency ratings, financial institutions sometimes
k chose k as seven, the number of performing unmodified grades used by the major rating agencies, or as
seventeen, the number of performing modified grades used by the agencies. In the latter case, grade 17 would
correspond to S&P grade AAA, grade 16 to S&P grade AA+ etc. until grade 1 that would correspond to S&P
grade CCC.
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Figure 1: Unconditional and conditional rating distributions. The distributions conditional on
default and survival respectively have been inferred from the unconditional distribu-
tion under the assumption that the unconditional PD is 5% and the accuracy ratio
associated with the rating model is either low at 25% or high at 75%. See example 3.3
for details of the calculations.
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Convention. Low values of the model output score indicate low creditworthiness, high values
of the score indicate high creditworthiness. The mapping of the scores to the rating grades
(expressed as positive integers) is increasing, i.e. high grades mean high creditworthiness.
2 Approximating rating error rate by misclassification rate
In the following, we assume that for every real-life rating model there are unavoidable rating
errors because defaults are unpredictable. We want to determine an approximation for the pro-
portion of such unavoidable rating errors compared to all rating actions. We also assume that
the rating models we consider are correctly calibrated such that no overrides are needed in order
to account for PD estimation bias. For the purpose of this paper, such overrides would be consid-
ered avoidable (by recalibration of the rating model). Establishing bounds for unavoidable errors
will help to identify overrides that are due to miscalibration and thus in principle avoidable.
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2.1 The typical process for rating overrides
Let us look at a – typically wholesale (e.g. corporates or financial institutions) – portfolio of
borrowers that are in the scope of application of the rating system under consideration. A rating
action for one of the borrowers consists of three steps:
• For the first step, a statistical model is applied to data (risk factors) related to the bor-
rower, typically financial ratios from the borrower’s balance sheet and/or qualitative as-
sessments by credit officers marked up on a standard scale. The result of this step is a
score s.
• For the second step, the score s is mapped (e.g. by means of a look-up table) to a grade
g∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The grade g∗ is called proposed rating.
• In the third step, the rating proposal g∗ is reviewed by a credit expert or a committee
of credit experts. The experts can decide to accept the rating proposal and assign the
borrower the final rating g = g∗. But the experts can also decide to reject the rating
proposal and assign the borrower a final rating g 6= g∗ (but with g ∈ {1, . . . , k}). If a
proposed rating is rejected, the experts have to record both the proposed and the final
ratings and the rationale for the rejection and the choice of the final rating.
The occurrence of g 6= g∗ in step three is called override (of the proposed rating). In most credit
institutions overrides are subject to certain restrictions which could include the following:
• Overrides are not allowed if the proposed ratings are better than or equal to some threshold
grade k∗ < k. This rule might be established when it is felt that the relative differences
between the better rating grades are so small that the grades cannot be meaningfully
differentiated by the human mind.
• Overrides are only allowed if the final ratings are significantly different to the proposed
ratings, e.g. if |g− g∗| ≥ b for some threshold value b. Such a rule might again be based on
the intuition that the human mind cannot differentiate between adjacent rating grades.
• Only downgrade overrides are allowed. This rule would express a desire for rating conser-
vatism.
If n is the number of rating actions4 with the rating system under consideration within a pre-
defined time period (e.g. one year), resulting in pairs (g∗1, g1), . . . , (g∗n, gn) of proposed and final
ratings, then the override rate is defined as the ratio of the number of rating actions with
different proposed and final ratings and the total number of rating actions:
Override rate =
#{i : g∗i 6= gi}
n
. (2.1)
2.2 ‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ ratings
From (2.1) we get the obvious upper bound of 100% for override rates – not very satisfactory.
It might then seem a natural idea to try to derive an “expected” override rate for a statistical
4The same borrower might be rated several times but usually each borrower needs to be rated at least once per
year.
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rating model by analysing the decision processes of the credit experts charged with reviewing the
rating proposals. One could argue that credit experts are likely to base their override decisons on
comparisons to borrowers rated in the past. This would mean that the experts look for similarities
between the borrower to be reviewed and the borrowers rated earlier. Such similarities might
relate to financial conditions, management quality or other descriptive information about the
borrowers.
Hence the procedure by credit experts to decide about possible overrides might be described in
mathematical terms as a methodology similar to the “m nearest neighbours” (m-NN) method-
ology (see, e.g., Hand, 1997, section 5.3), which is well-known in fields like Pattern Recognition
or Statistical Classification. However, this analogy is not a promising path to the prediction of
override rates. Assuming we were able to identify the number m of neighbours to be included in
the m-NN analysis, we would end up with developing another rating system especially for the
override decision process. But there is no reason to be sure that such a competitor rating would
be more predictive of creditworthiness than the statistical model under review.
A more promising approach to bounds for override rates is to start from an interpretation of
overrides as corrective actions. Then all ’wrong’ – in a sense to be determined – ratings proposed
by the statistical model should be overridden. Hence the proportion of wrong proposed ratings
would be the ‘natural’ override rate. As in practice it is impossible to identify wrong ratings
with certainty the natural override rate would be an upper bound for the number of overrides.
This follows from the following considerations:
• Assume the observed override rate exceeds the natural override rate. Then there are two
possible explanations for this. The credit experts could have overridden too many ratings
and, hence, have turned some correct ratings into wrong ratings. Or the proportion of
wrong ratings is higher than expected and, hence, the discriminatory power of the sta-
tistical model is lower than predicted. Both explanations imply a deficiency in the rating
process that should be rectified.
• Assume the observed override rate is less than the natural overide rate. Again there are
two possible explanations. The credit experts could have overridden too few ratings and,
hence, have failed to amend all wrong ratings. Or the proportion of wrong ratings is lower
than expected and, hence, the discriminatory power of the statistical model is higher than
predicted. While the first explanation may or may not indicate a deficiency in the rating
process, the second explanation actually would be good news.
• With a view on the potential consequences of these two cases (“override rate exceeds the
natural override rate” and “override rate is below the natural override rate”), we observe
that the first case is clearly more of a concern than the second case. For the first case
indicates with certainty a deficiency of the rating process while in the second case there
is a possibility that the statistical model actually is better than expected. This is why in
practice the natural override rate can only be regarded as an upper bound for the observed
override rate whose breach should trigger corrective action.
So far, so well – but how do we know which proportion of rating proposals is wrong? Clearly, if
we knew which would be the right – or maybe only the most predictive – ratings we would be
done because then we could insert the right ratings as the final ratings gi in (2.1). Interestingly
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enough, if we assume that the most predictive ratings can be determined based on the analysis
of a finite number of risk factors, then in theory a most predictive statistical rating model exists.
This follows from the Neyman-Pearson lemma (see, e.g., Casella and Berger, 2002, Theorem
8.3.12) that identifies the most predictive statistic for the test of two simple hypotheses as the
ratio of the two multi-variate joint densities of the risk factors on the defaulter population and
the survivor population respectively. Unfortunately, even if it all relevant risk factors could be
identified, in practice it would be impossible to estimate accurately enough the two risk factor
densities.
Alternative candidates for the most predictive ratings might be agency ratings as well as the
results of expert ranking exercises. However, both agency ratings and expert rankings are not
always available. More importantly, even if the quality of agency ratings for corporates is good
in general, there is no reason to consider them the ‘right’ ratings, implying the ‘right’ ranking.
If for nothing else, this follows from the fact that ratings from different agencies for the same
entities coincide often but not always. By exception, the assessments by different agencies may
differ significantly. Similarly, for samples of borrowers ranked by experts, the resulting rankings
will depend more often than not on the selection of the experts and possibly also on the way
the assessments by the single experts are combined to one ranking.
So, as it proves difficult to compare the statistical rating model in question to ‘right’ or most
predictive ratings, why not comparing it to a perfect (or ‘prophetic’) rating system? This ap-
proach might seem strange at first glance, but it turns out to be viable – even if it delivers only
an approximation to the natural override rate.
A perfect rating system obviously needs only two grades: Default and survival. We have to
define a mapping from the rating grades that are assigned by the statistical rating model in
question to the two states of default and survival in order to be able to calculate which portion
of the borrowers in the portfolio would have to be moved were the distribution of borrowers
across the range of proposed grades to be transformed into a distribution according to a perfect
rating system. For this purpose, we assume that the perfect rating system for the comparison is
‘realised’ on the rating scale of the rating model under consideration. This implies that there is
a multitude of perfect rating systems that could be used as the target for the comparison. For
each rating system that assigns defaulters and survivors to disjoint sets of grades is perfect.
To devise the mapping from the proposed ratings to the perfect ratings, inspection of the concept
of investment and speculative grades employed by the major rating agencies proves helpful.
Moody’s define Investment grade as the combination of grades Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa while
they call Speculative grade the combination of grades Ba, B, and Caa-C. Similarly, S&P define
Investment grade as the combination of grades AAA, AA, A, and BBB and Speculative grade
as the combination of grades BB, B, and CCC-C.
Table 1 presents long-run average annual default rates for investment and speculative grade
borrowers as observed by Moody’s and S&P. On the one hand, these default rates show that,
from a credit default perspective, Moody’s and S&P’s investment grade and speculative grade
definitions are broadly equivalent. On the other hand, and more important for this paper, the
observed default rates support the description of investment grade borrowers as ‘very unlikely to
default within a year’ and of speculative grade borrowers as ‘at significant risk of default within
7
Table 1: Average annual default rates as recorded by Moody’s (2011, Exhibit 35) and S&P (2011,
Table 24).
Agency Investment grade Speculative grade Observation period
Moody’s 0.095% 4.944% 1983-2010
S&P 0.13% 4.36% 1981-2010
a year’. One might even be tempted to talk about investment grade borrowers as ‘safe’ borrowers
and about speculative grade borrowers as ‘risky’ borrowers. This can be seen as a reasonable
approximation of a perfect rating system with the two grades ‘defaulter’ and ‘survivor’ only.
Intuitively, a coarse classification of borrowers into safe and risky should be easier to achieve
than the much finer differentiation envisaged by the rating agencies and most internal rating
systems of financial institutions. Indeed, the restrictions of overrides discussed in section 2.1
might be rationalised by the consideration that it is primarily the safe vs. risky differentiation
that one has to get right.
We adopt this view for our approach to the identification of bounds for override rates with
‘natural’ error rates. Hence, we will define the natural error rate as the misclassification rate in
a two-state coarse rating system that is derived from the statistical rating model in question by
combining a suitable subset of grades to a ‘safe’ super-grade and the complementary subset of
grades to a ‘risky’ super-grade.
2.3 Natural error rate
We consider first how to determine the sets of scores or grades that define the two super-grades
safe and risky. Then we discuss how to calculate the corresponding misclassification rate that
will be defined as the natural error rate associated with the statistical rating model in question.
Actually, these two problems can be solved in a fully general context. Hence although in principle
we only need to investigate the cases of a rating variable with a finite range of values and of
a continuous real-valued score variable, the major part of the following discussion applies to
any random variable S with values in a general measurable space – only minor modifications of
the notation might be necessary. In practice the measurable space will be a multi-dimensional
Euclidian space Rn when we are dealing with the risk factors informing a rating model, an open
real interval I ⊂ R when we are talking about the score output of a rating model, or a finite
ordered set (without loss of generality {1, 2, . . . , k}, with k being the number of performing
rating grades) when the discussion is about the ratings proposed by a rating model or the final
ratings after overrides.
Notation. We assume that the conditional and unconditional distributions of S have densities
with respect to a suitable measure. To make it clear when a statement or an equation is general
we adopt the likelihood function notation where a likelihood ` can stand both for a probability
density function in a continuous or general context or for a probability mass function in a discrete
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context.
Speaking in technical terms, in this paper we study the joint distribution of a pair (S,Z) of
random variables. As mentioned before, the meaning of the variable S could be a vector of risk
factors, a rating model score, or a rating grade, observed for a solvent borrower at a fixed date.
The variable Z is the borrower’s state of solvency one observation period (usually one year)
after S was observed. Z takes on the two values 0 and 1. The meaning of Z = 0 is ‘borrower has
remained solvent’ (solvency or survival), Z = 1 means ‘borrower has become insolvent’ (default).
We write D for the event {Z = 1} and N for the event {Z = 0}. Hence
D ∩N = {Z = 1} ∩ {Z = 0} = ∅, D ∪N = whole space. (2.2)
The marginal distribution of the state variable Z is characterised by the unconditional probability
of default p which is defined as the probability of the default event D:
p = P[D] = P[Z = 1] ∈ (0, 1). (2.3)
The joint distribution of (S,Z) then can be specified by p and the two distributions of S
conditional on the states of Z (i.e. the events D and N respectively). Most important are
the cases where the conditional distributions are given by discrete conditional probabilities
`D(s) = P[S = s |D] and `N (s) = P[S = s |N ], s = 1, . . . , k, or by Lebesgue densities `D and
`N . In the latter case, the probabilities of S taking a value in a set M conditional on default
and survival respectively can be written as
P[S ∈M |D] =
∫
M
`D(s) ds and P[S ∈M |N ] =
∫
M
`N (s) ds. (2.4)
The joint distribution of the pair (S,Z) of the score and the borrower’s state one period later can
also be specified by the unconditional distribution P[S ∈ · ] of S (i.e. the score or rating profile)
and the PDs P[D |S] = 1 − P[N |S] conditional on S. In the special cases we have mentioned
before, by Bayes’ rule we have the following representations of the conditional PDs:
• S is understood as rating grade, i.e. S ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Then
P[D |S = s] = pP[S = s |D]
pP[S = s |D] + (1− p) P[S = s |N ] , s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. (2.5a)
• S is a continuous score variable or a vector of continuous risk factors such that there are
Lebesgue densities `N and `D of the distributions conditional on default and survival as
in (2.4). Then
P[D |S = s] = p fD(s)
p fD(s) + (1− p) fN (s) . (2.5b)
With the likelihood notation, (2.5a) and (2.5b) can be expressed in one equation:
P[D |S = s] = p `D(s)
p `D(s) + (1− p) `N (s) . (2.5c)
Thanks to (2.5c) the conditional PDs are determined by the unconditional PD and the distri-
butions of the score conditional on default and survival. The conditional and the unconditional
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PDs are the information we need to determine the intended split of the score or rating range
into the two super-grades safe and risky. The split suggested is based on the minimisation of the
so-called expected misclassification cost (see, e.g., Hand and Till, 2001).
Proposition 2.1 Assume that the expected cost of misclassifying a defaulting borrower as sol-
vent is cD > 0 and that the expected cost of misclassifying a solvent borrower as defaulting is
cN > 0. Define the events D and N as in (2.2) and the unconditional PD p as in (2.3). As-
sume that a borrower is classified as defaulting if and only if the borrower’s score (or rating or
vector of risk factors) S takes on a value in a predefined set A. Then the expected cost C of
misclassification is given by
C = cD pP[S /∈ A |D] + cN (1− p) P[S ∈ A |N ]. (2.6)
The expected cost C of misclassification is minimal if and only if the set A is chosen as the
following set A∗:
A∗ =
{
P[D |S] > cN
cN + cD
}
. (2.7)
See, for instance, Nechval et al. (2010, Theorem 2) for a proof of proposition 2.1. Note that
(2.7) defines a risky super-grade in the sense that the average PD conditional on the score or
rating on the set A∗ is greater than the average PD conditional on the score or rating on the
complement of the set A∗:
E
[
P[D |S] |S ∈ A∗] > cN
cN + cD
≥ E[P[D |S] |S /∈ A∗]. (2.8)
How to choose the cost parameters cD and cN in (2.7)? Hand (2009, section 4) has commented
that in general it is extremely difficult to determine values for the cost parameters. Even as it
obviously suffices to specify the ratio of the cost parameters, most of time it appears difficult to
come to a meaningful assessment.
Nonetheless, as noted by Hand (2009, section 4), chosing the cost parameters inversely pro-
portional to the unconditional class probabilities is popular. In the setting of this paper, this
means
cD = 1/p and cN = 1/(1− p). (2.9)
In a context of risky lending, (2.9) is actually a quite reasonable choice. Assume that the credit
decision is about a loan with principal M and that the expected loss rate in the case of default
is 0 < λ ≤ 1. Then the effective (after cost of funding) interest charged for the loan should be
at least a provision for the expected loss which equals M λp. If we prudentially assume that the
interest is paid in advance then the lending institution’s loss in the case of lending to a defaulter
will be
M λ−M λp = M λ (1− p). (2.10a)
The loss in case of not lending to a customer who turns out not to be a defaulter will be (at least)
M λp. Together with (2.10a) this implies for the ratio of the misclassification cost parameters
M λ (1− p)
M λp
=
1/p
1/(1− p) =
cD
cN
, (2.10b)
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with cD and cN as suggested in (2.9). Even if the assumption on interest being paid in advance
clearly is often not satisfied in practice, for not too large PD p the ratio of misclassification costs
will still be of a magnitude similar to the left-hand side of (2.10b). We therefore adopt (2.9) for
the choice of the cost parameters in our application of proposition 2.1.
Observe that with cost parameters as defined by (2.9), by equations (2.5c) and (2.7) the optimal
set A∗ of grades or ratings for classifying borrowers as defaulting can be rewritten as follows:
A∗ =
{
1
1 +
(
(1− p)/p) (`N (S)/`D(S)) > 11 + cD/cN
}
=
{
`D(S)
`N (S)
>
1− p
p
cN
cD
}
(2.11a)
=
{
`D(S)
`N (S)
> 1
}
. (2.11b)
Comparison of (2.11a) and (2.11b) shows that the same optimal set A∗ for classifying borrowers
as defaulting is found, no matter whether we start from a general unconditional PD p and cost
parameters given by (2.9) or from p = 50% and equal cost parameters cD = cN .
Remark 2.2 Assume that the variable S from proposition 2.1 stands for a one-dimensional
score or rating. If the likelihood ratio `D(s)`N (s) is decreasing
5 in s (or, equivalently, the PD condi-
tional on the score P[D |S = s] is increasing in s) then the set A∗ from (2.7) indicating the
classification of borrowers as defaulting can be written as
A∗ = {S ≤ s∗},
s∗ = sup
{
s :
`D(s)
`N (s)
> 1
}
.
(2.12)
In this case the minimum classification cost C∗ according to (2.6) with cost parameters defined
by (2.9) is equivalent to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic applied to the distribution functions
of the score or rating conditional on default and survival respectively:
C∗ = 1−max
s
∣∣ P[S ≤ s |D]− P[S ≤ s |N ] ∣∣ . (2.13)
This is an interesting observation since it justifies, in economic terms, the use of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic and of the closely related accuracy ratio for the performance measurement of
rating systems.
With (2.11b) we have identified the decision rule that should be applied to determine the two-
state coarse rating system that was discussed in section 2.2. This rating system is an overlay to
the statistical rating model whose output is the variable S we have considered in proposition 2.1
and its conclusions. The misclassification rate of the overlaying rating system with the two
super-grades ‘risky’ and ‘safe’ gives us a reasonable bound for the override rate of the statistical
rating model S.
5See Tasche (2008) for a discussion of the connection between monotonicity of the likelihood ratio and optimality
of the model scores.
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Proposition 2.3 Define the natural error rate (S) of a statistical rating model with output S
as the misclassification rate associated with the decision rule (2.11b) for classifying borrowers
as defaulting. Let p denote the unconditional probability of default. Then (S) is given by
(S) = pP[`D(S) ≤ `N (S) |D] + (1− p) P[`D(S) > `N (S) |N ]. (2.14a)
Note that the natural error rate as defined by (2.14a) is an actual error rate in the terminology
of Hand (1997, section 7.2). If the output of the statistical rating model is a rating proposal or
a discrete score with values in {1, . . . , k} then the likelihood functions in (2.14a) are probability
mass functions. Let
J =
{
j : P[S = j |D] > P[S = j |N ]}. (2.14b)
Then (2.14a) can be written as
(S) = p
∑
j /∈J
P[S = j |D] + (1− p)
∑
j∈J
P[S = j |N ]. (2.14c)
If the output of the statistical rating model is a continuous score with values in an open interval
I then the likelihood functions in (2.14a) are probability density functions. (2.14a) can then be
represented as
(S) = p
∫
{s∈I:`D(s)≤`N (s)}
`D(s) ds+ (1− p)
∫
{s∈I:`D(s)>`N (s)}
`N (s) ds. (2.14d)
As mentioned before, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the natural error rate of
a statistical rating model as defined formally in proposition 2.3 is a suitable bound for the rate
of overrides that should be applied to the model’s rating proposals. In section 3, we show that
the natural error rate has the intuitive property that its value increases when the discriminatory
power of the statistical rating models declines. This observation strengthens the case we have
made in section 2.2 for the adoption of the natural error rate as a bound for the rating override
rate.
It is worthwhile noting, however, that a regrouping of borrowers according to the decision rule
(2.11b) underlying the coarse approximate rating system would imply moving a much larger
portion of solvent borrowers from the ‘risky’ grade to the ‘safe’ grade than of defaulting borrowers
from safe to risky. This observation might seem counterintuitive at first glance. Nonetheless, in
practice the movement from risky to safe would be quite restrictived as only borrowers that have
been very clearly misclassified should be moved. This consideration indicates that the ‘natural
error rate’ indeed is an upper bound for the rating override rate since most of the misclassified
borrowers cannot be identified with reasonable certainty.
3 Override rate and discriminatory power
Define the conditional distribution functions FD and FN of the score or rating variable S de-
scribed in section 2.3 by
FD(s) = P[S ≤ s |D] and FN (s) = P[S ≤ s |N ], (3.1)
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and denote by SD and SN independent random variables that are distributed according to FD
and FN respectively.
For quantifying discriminatory power, we apply the notion of accuracy ratio (AR) as specified
in Tasche (2009, eq. (3.28b)):
AR = 2 P[SD < SN ] + P[SD = SN ]− 1
= P[SD < SN ]− P[SD > SN ]
=
∫
P[S < s |D] dFN (s)−
∫
P[S < s |N ] dFD(s),
(3.2)
See Hand and Till (2001, section 2) for a discussion of why this definition of accuracy ratio (or
the related definition of the area under the ROC curve) is more expedient than the also common
definition in geometric terms. Definition (3.2) of AR takes an ‘ex post’ perspective by assuming
the obligors’ states D or N one year after having been scored are known and hence can be used
for estimating the conditional (on default and survival respectively) score distributions FD and
FN .
3.1 The binormal case
The ex-post perspective on discriminatory power is appropriate when we consider the important
binormal special case where both conditional score distributions are normal distributions with
different mean values but equal variances. This special case, in particular, motivates the choice
of the inverse logit function for modelling PD curves (see, e.g., Cramer, 2003, section 6.1) since
in practice it is often reasonable to assume that the two conditional score distributions are
approximately normal.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that the conditional distributions of the score variable S are given by
SD ∼ N (µD, σ) and SN ∼ N (µN , σ) with µD ≤ µN . Let p denote the unconditional probability
of default as given by (2.3). Then the accuracy ratio AR associated with S according to (3.2)
can be calculated as6
AR = 2 Φ
(
µN − µD√
2σ
)
− 1. (3.3a)
The natural error rate (S) of S according to proposition 2.3 is given by
(S) = Φ
(
µD − µN
2σ
)
. (3.3b)
With the cost parameters defined by (2.9), the average conditional PDs on the set of scores
indicating default and on the set of scores indicating survival respectively (as in eq. (2.8)) are
given by
E
[
P[D |S] |S ∈ A∗] = p (1− (S))
p (1− (S)) + (1− p) (S) ,
E
[
P[D |S] |S /∈ A∗] = p (S)
p (S) + (1− p) (1− (S)) .
(3.3c)
6Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function.
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Proof. (3.3a) follows from Tasche (2009, eq. (3.14) and proposition 3.15). For (3.3b) and (3.3c),
observe that in the binormal case with equal variances we have
S /∈ A∗ ⇐⇒ `D(S) ≤ `N (S) ⇐⇒ S ≥ µD + µN
2
.
From this observation, we deduce that
P[`D(S) ≤ `N (S) |D] = 1− Φ
(
µN − µD
2σ
)
and
P[`D(S) > `N (S) |N ] = Φ
(
µD − µN
2σ
)
.
These equations imply (3.3b). With regard to (3.3c), we apply the definition of conditional
expectation to arrive at the following computation7:
E
[
P[D |S] |S ∈ A∗] = P[P[D |S]1{S∈A∗}]
P[S ∈ A∗]
=
P[D ∩ {S < µD+µN2 }]
P[S < µD+µN2 ]
=
P[S < µD+µN2 |D] P[D]
P[S < µD+µN2 |D] P[D] + P[S > µD+µN2 |N ] P[N ]
=
pΦ
(µN−µD
2σ
)
pΦ
(µN−µD
2σ
)
+ (1− p) Φ(µD−µN2σ ) .
Since Φ
(µN−µD
2σ
)
= 1− (S) we obtain the first equation in (3.3c). The second equation follows
in the same way. 2
In proposition 3.1, it is a general property of the accuracy ratio that it does not depend on
the unconditional PD. The observation that the natural error rate does not depend on the
unconditional PD might be surprising at first glance. This observation, however, is primarily
a consequence of the fact that both conditional score distributions are members of the same
location-scale distribution family, different only by the different location parameters. In addition,
symmetry of the location zero member of the family is required to imply the property that the
error does not depend on the unconditional PD.
Combining (3.3a) and (3.3b) provides a simple relationship between the discriminatory power
as measured by the accuracy ratio and the natural error rate in the binormal case with equal
variances. Eq. (3.4) shows, in particular, that the natural rating error indeed decreases when
the discriminatory power of the statistical rating model increases.
7We define the indicator function 1M of a set M by 1M (m) =
{
1, m ∈M,
0, m /∈M.
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Figure 2: Natural error rate as function of the discriminatory power (accuracy ratio) for the
binormal case described in corollary 3.2 and for the discrete rating model described in
example 3.3.
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Corollary 3.2 Assume that the conditional distributions of the score variable S are given by
SD ∼ N (µD, σ) and SN ∼ N (µN , σ) with µD ≤ µN . Then the accuracy ratio AR and the natural
error rate (S) associated with S are related by the following equation:
(S) = Φ
(
− 1√
2
Φ−1
(AR+ 1
2
))
. (3.4)
See figure 2 for a graphical representation of relation (3.4).
3.2 The discrete case
For practical applications, often one cannot assume that the conditional score distributions are
normally distributed. Moreover, as described in section 2.1, it is actually not the score output
of a statistical rating model that may be overridden but the proposed ratings derived from the
scores. Typically, thresholds for override rates for a statistical rating model are established when
the development of the model is being finished and the documentation of the related rating
system is compiled. At this stage, it is unlikely that reliable estimates of the score distribution
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conditional on the borrower’s solvency state or of the proposed rating distributions conditional
on the borrower’s solvency state are available. Therefore, we also consider the case where the
unconditional distribution of the proposed ratings (rating profile) and the associated PD curve
(i.e. the estimates of the PDs conditional on the proposed ratings) are all that is known.
Nonetheless, with this information it is still possible to compute both the natural error rate and
the accuracy ratio for the statistical rating model in question. Key to these computations is the
following observation that eq. (2.5a) can be ‘inverted’ such that the distributions of the proposed
ratings conditional on the borrower’s solvency state can be derived from the unconditional rating
profile and the PD curve:
p = E
[
P[D |S]] = k∑
s=1
P[D |S = s] P[S = s],
P[S = s |D] = P[D |S = s] P[S = s]/p, s = 1, . . . , k,
P[S = s |N ] = (1− P[D |S = s])P[S = s]/(1− p), s = 1, . . . , k.
(3.5)
By (3.5) and (2.14c), the natural error rate can be calculated from the profile s 7→ P[S = s] of
the proposed ratings and the PD curve s 7→ P[D |S = s]. By combining (3.2) and (3.5), also
the accuracy ratio of the ratings proposed by the statistical model can be determined from the
rating profile and the PD curve:
AR =
1
p (1− p)
(
2
k∑
s=1
(
1− P[D |S = s])P[S = s] s−1∑
t=1
P[D |S = t] P[S = t]
+
k∑
s=1
P[D |S = s] (1− P[D |S = s])P[S = s]2) − 1. (3.6)
Calculation of the accuracy ratio by means of the combination of (3.5) and (3.6) may be inter-
preted as predicting the accuracy ratio ‘ex ante’ since it can be done on the current portfolio as
soon as estimates of the PDs conditional on the rating grades (PD curve) are available.
There is no obvious general example of a discrete rating model comparable to the binormal
model from corollary 3.2 that would allow the direct study of the connection between discrim-
inatory power and natural error rate. We therefore explore this connection in the discrete case
by means of a specific example. In order to make the example differ significantly from the nor-
mal assumption discussed before it has been chosen in a way as to create a certain degree of
unsymmetry and overdispersion.
Example 3.3 The unconditional distribution of the ratings on a discrete scale from 1 to 17 is
given by a correlated binomial distribution. That is if S stands for a borrower’s rating grade, S
can be written as S = X + 1 where the distribution of X is specified by8
P[X ≤ x] =
∞∫
−∞
ϕ(y)
x∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
G(λ, %, y)i (1−G(λ, %, y))k−i d y, x = 0, . . . k,
G(λ, %, y) = Φ
(Φ−1(λ)−√% y√
1− %
)
.
(3.7a)
8ϕ denotes the standard normal density function: ϕ(t) = e
−t2/2√
2pi
.
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Figure 3: PD curves for the rating model described in example 3.3. The curves have been inferred
from the unconditional rating distribution shown in figure 1 under the assumption that
the unconditional PD is 5% and the accuracy ratio associated with the rating model
is either low at 25% or high at 75%.
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For the purpose of this example we chose the following values for the parameters k (number
of grades minus one), λ (determines mean of the distribution) and % (drives overdispersion
compared to binomial distribution) in (3.7a):
k = 16, λ = 0.55, % = 0.1. (3.7b)
We assume that the PD conditional on a rating grade S = s is appropriately discribed by the
inverse logit function:
P[D |S = s] = 1
1 + ea+b s
, s = 1, . . . , 17. (3.8)
The parameters a and b are determined by quasi-moment matching (Tasche, 2009, section 5.2).
This approach works by equating the right-hand side of the first equation of (3.5) and the right-
hand side of (3.6) to predefined values of PD and AR respectively and solving numerically for
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Table 2: Natural error rate as function of the discriminatory power (accuracy ratio) for the
binormal case described in corollary 3.2 and for the discrete rating model described in
example 3.3. See figure 2 for a graphical representation.
AR Natural error rate
Binormal Discrete, PD=1% Discrete, PD=10%
0.0 0.500 0.452 0.461
0.1 0.465 0.451 0.448
0.2 0.429 0.450 0.435
0.3 0.393 0.448 0.422
0.4 0.355 0.320 0.306
0.5 0.317 0.319 0.291
0.6 0.276 0.317 0.276
0.7 0.232 0.206 0.260
0.8 0.182 0.204 0.154
0.9 0.122 0.118 0.131
a and b:
PD =
17∑
s=1
P[S = s] P[D |S = s] =
17∑
s=1
P[X = s− 1]
1 + ea+b s
,
AR =
1
PD (1− PD)
(
2
17∑
s=1
ea+b s
1 + ea+b s
P[X = s− 1]
s−1∑
t=1
P[X = t− 1]
1 + ea+b t
(3.9)
+
17∑
s=1
ea+b s(
1 + ea+b s
)2 P[X = s− 1]2) − 1.
Figure 3 illustrates the results of quasi-moment matching according to (3.9). In particular, it
becomes clear that the slope of the PD curve is primarily controlled by the discriminatory
power of the rating model as expressed by its accuracy ratio. The two curves from figure 3 have
been used together with the unconditional rating distribution as specified by (3.7a) to calculate
(by means of (3.5)) the conditional rating distributions that are shown in figure 1. Once the
conditional rating distributions have been determined, the natural error rates (and hence bounds
for the overrides) may be computed by means of equations (2.14b) and (2.14c).
3.3 Comparing the binormal and the discrete results
The same approach that was used for the calculation of the conditional rating distributions in
figure 1 has also been applied in order to calculate the discrete error rate curves for figure 2, albeit
with different parameters. For figure 2, the calculations were done for a small unconditional PD
(1%) and a large unconditional PD (10%). Each of the two PDs was combined with the whole
range [0, 1) of potential ARs to first determine conditional PD curves by means of (3.9) and
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Table 3: Average ‘safe’ and ‘risky’ PDs as function of the discriminatory power (AR) for the
binormal case (3.3c) and example 3.3. The assumed unconditional PD is 1%.
AR (%) Binormal Discrete
Safe PD (%) Risky PD (%) Safe PD (%) Risky PD (%)
0 1 1 1 1
10 0.87 1.15 0.87 1.16
20 0.75 1.33 0.74 1.32
30 0.65 1.54 0.61 1.47
40 0.55 1.8 0.57 1.9
50 0.47 2.13 0.45 2.15
60 0.38 2.58 0.34 2.39
70 0.3 3.24 0.32 3.54
80 0.22 4.33 0.19 4.02
90 0.14 6.75 0.13 7.06
then natural error rates by means of (2.14b) and (2.14c). The discontinuities in the ‘discrete’
curves are owed to changes in the index set J from (2.14b) which cause jumps in the values of
the error rates. Despite the jumps, the two discrete curves are remarkably close to the binormal
curve from corollary 3.2. This observation is confirmed by table 2 that provides the numerical
values for some of the points on the three curves in figure 2. It appears therefore worthwhile to
consider that the ‘normal’ values calculated with (3.4) are taken to indicate the link between
discriminatory power and override even for non-normal cases.
In section 2.2, the approach to override rate bounds via the misclassification rate of a coarse two-
state rating system was motivated by an inspection of the investment and speculative grades
concept used by the major rating agencies. By table 1, we had noted that investment grade
may be interpreted as ‘safe’ and speculative grade may be regarded as ‘risky’. Table 3 presents
‘risky’ and ‘safe’ grade PDs in the sense of equation (2.8) for the normal and discrete examples
considered in this section.
Note the similarity between the average PDs from the 80% accuracy ratio row of table 3 and
the observed investment and speculative grade default rates from table 1. Moody’s report an
overall average annual default rate of 1.8% (Moody’s, 2011, Exhibit 35) and an average one-year
accuracy ratio of c. 85% (Moody’s, 2011, Exhibit 15). S&P report an overall average annual
default rate of 1.6% (S&P, 2011, Table 24) and an average one-year accuracy ratio of c. 84%
(S&P, 2011, Table 2). Hence the observed similarity between average PDs on the ‘risky’ and ‘safe’
super-grades and the investment and speculative grade default rates recorded by the agencies
might not be an incident. Rather one might guess that there is an expected cost concept like the
one presented in proposition 2.1 behind the agencies’ investment versus speculative classification.
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4 Monitoring rating overrides
In order to put the considerations from the previous sections into context, in this section we
describe an illustrative framework for the monitoring of rating overrides. In particular, we make
suggestions for the role that the natural error rate defined in proposition 2.3 could play as a
bound (limit) for the override rate in such a framework.
Let us start by recalling the observations on statistical rating models and rating overrides that
have lead us to suggesting the natural error rate as possible limit for rating override rates.
• No statistical rating model can predict credit defaults with certainty. In particular if the
financial consequences of wrong rating decisions can be serious, therefore, rating proposals
by models should be scrutinised by credit experts and be overridden if necessary.
• However, also the credit experts can be wrong with their decisions. Hence, there is a need
to monitor the performance of the overrides, too.
• On a single case basis, it is not possible to decide whether a rating decision was right or
wrong. Even an override of a CCC rating proposal to a AAA rating, followed immediately
by the borrower’s default, could in principle be just an occurence of bad luck.
• Nonetheless, on the basis of the expected cost of misclassification, it is possible to identify
sets of ’safe’ and ’risky’ rating grades, thus overlaying a ’coarse’ rating system onto the
original system with a finer rating scale. The safe and risky super-grades represent a ’will
survive’ and a ’will default’ prediction respectively.
• The expected error rate of the ’coarse’ rating system is called natural error rate. If the
application of overrides is restricted to fundamental errors (i.e. safe borrowers are classified
as risky or risk borrowers are classified as safe) the natural error rate is also a natural
override rate.
• On portfolios with sufficient numbers of default observations, the natural error rate can
be directly estimated (ex post). On portfolios with low numbers of default observations,
the natural error rate can still be inferred from the rating profile and the PD curve of the
rating model (ex ante).
• An observed override rate higher than the natural error rate could be a consequence of
unnecessary and potentially erroneous overrides or of an overestimation of the discrimina-
tory power of the rating model. In either case, the rating process would have been found
to operate sub-optimally.
• An observed override rate lower than the natural error rate could be a consequence of
overlooked rating errors or of an underestimation of the discriminatory power of the rating
model. No clear immediate conclusion on the well- or malfunction of the rating process
would be possible.
Based on these observations and with a view on affirming correct calibration of the rating model,
an overriding monitoring framework could include the following elements:
At the beginning of the observation period (typically one year)
• Infer the natural error rate from the rating profile and the PD curve, by making use of
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(2.14c) and (3.5), or from the accuracy ratio, by (3.4).
• Discourage credit experts from minor rating override. Only fundamental rating errors
should be amended by overrides.
At the end of the observation period
• If there is a sufficient number of default observations, the discriminatory power of the
rating system pre and post overrides should be computed. If the discriminatory power
post overrides is significantly lower than the power pre overrides an update of the override
governance might be necessary.
• If the observed override rate exceeds the natural error rate, the consistency of the PD
curve with the observed discriminatory power should be checked (if there is a sufficient
number of defaults) by comparing it to the ex ante accuracy ratio (3.6) because the slope
of the PD curve might be too large. If the number of observed defaults is not sufficient for
the ex post estimation of discriminatory power it should be confirmed that the overrides
were justified (e.g. by interviews with the credit experts). If this is confirmed the PD curve
must be amended as to reflect the lower than expected discriminatory power.
• If the observed override rate is lower than the natural error rate it should be confirmed
(e.g. by internal audit) that the due procedure is followed with regard to overrides. If this is
the case amendment of the PD curve as to reflect the higher than expected discriminatory
power could be considered.
• An imbalance of upward and downward rating overrides with more upward overrides might
be an indication of PD overestimation. If further analyis finds (e.g. based on statistical
tests pre and post overrides if there is a sufficient number of default observations) that
there is no overestimation an update of the override governance might be necessary.
• An imbalance of upward and downward rating overrides with more downward overrides
might be an indication of PD underestimation. If further analyis finds that there is no
underestimation an update of the override governance might be necessary.
5 Conclusions
The first part of this paper presents a suggestion of how to determine bounds for the rates of
overrides of rating proposals determined by statistical rating models. In practice, often the guid-
ance for such overrides tends to restrict them to essential cases where the model’s assessments
of borrowers as risky or safe might not be correct. Motivated by this observation, the suggested
bound for the override rate is the misclassification rate of a coarse rating system with the two
grades ‘risky’ and ‘safe’. This coarse rating system is fed by the output of the rating model in
question and combines its rating grades to two super-grades, thereby minimising the expected
cost of misclassification. The rate of misclassifications with the coarse rating system is called
‘natural error rate’. It is argued that the natural error rate is an appropriate bound for the
override rate of the statistical rating model in question.
In the second part of the paper, methods for determining the natural error rate and its use in
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an illustrative framework for the monitoring of overrides are discussed. It turns out that there
is a particularly simple formula (eq. (3.4)) for the natural error rate if the rating distributions
conditional on the borrower’s solvency state are both normal with equal variance (binormal
case). Formula (3.4) for the natural error rate suggests that the natural error rate decreases when
the disciminatory power of the rating model increases – as it should intuitively be expected. We
compare the results from the ‘binormal’ formula to results for the natural error rate from a more
realistic discrete-valued example of a rating model. The comparison shows the results by both
approaches to be very close. This observation indicates that the binormal formula might be used
in general as a rule of thumb for deriving a bound for the override rate from the discriminatory
power of the rating model.
As demonstrated in the paper, the natural error rate of a rating model can be calculated both
ex post, based on the discriminatory power realised during a previous observation period, and
ex ante at the beginning of the observation period. In the latter case one applies Bayes’ rule
to determine the discriminatory power implied by the combination of rating distribution and
PD curve associated with the rating model. Both the ex post and the ex ante methods to the
computation of the natural error rate as a bound for the override rate are promising tools for
validating and monitoring the performance of statistical rating models.
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